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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I. SUPPLEMENTAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS REVERSIBLE ERROR IF
THEY EXPRESSLY REQUIRE JURY TO REACH VERDICT
In Crim v. Shirer,1 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that supplemental jury instructions2 urging agreement on an
award of damages were prejudicial because the instructions sug-
gested to the jury that they would not be excused until an agree-
ment was reached on the amount of the damage award. Conced-
ing that the issue was close, the court reversed and remanded
the case for a new trial' without establishing useful guidelines
for the bench as to the permissible scope of supplemental in-
structions which urge the jury to agree on a verdict.
In this case, the plaintiff sought damages for alleged slander
and assault and battery by the defendant.4 During the course of
the trial, the judge dismissed the slander cause of action and
directed a verdict for the plaintiff on the issue of liability in the
assault and battery claim. The only question submitted to the
jury was the amount of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff.
Less than two hours after retiring, the jury informed the court
1. 278 S.C. 639, 300 S.E.2d 731 (1983).
2. The court quoted as follows the portion of the trial judge's instructions held to be
prejudicial:
Now, what we're going to do is that we're going to stay here just as long as it
takes for us to come up with some form of verdict because we're not going to
spend a day and a half of the Court's time next week with twelve more jurors
on this particular case. We're going to reach a verdict of a type that speaks the
truth and involves the collective wisdom of the twelve of you, and I'm not
asking any of you to abandon a feeling or a belief that you feel that you just
cannot part with, but this case isn't a criminal case, where I wouldn't stress
that you give and take. We're not dealing here with guilt or innocence of an
individual. What you have to decide is one question, and that's simply an
amount of money.
We'll make you as comfortable as possible, but we want this litigation en-
ded, and you twelve ladies and gentlemen, no question in my mind, you're the
ones to do it.
Id. at 641, 300 S.E.2d at 732.
3. Id., 300 S.E.2d at 733.
4. Id. at 640, 300 S.E.2d at 731.
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that it could not reach a verdict. The jury was brought into the
courtroom and the instructions in question were given.5 The jury
then deliberated for an additional hour and reached a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff for $500.00 actual and $10,000.00 punitive
damages.8
In reversing this judgment, the supreme court noted that it
was well within the discretion of the trial judge to urge a jury to
agree on a verdict' and that the judge in this case was obviously
motivated by good intentions." The court ruled, however, that
the likelihood of prejudice was sufficiently strong to compel re-
versal of the verdict. The court held that a judge must not at-
tempt to coerce or force the jury to agree upon a verdict or any
particular verdict. While the judge may advise and persuade, the
court continued, he or she may not say or do anything to force a
decision. Determining that the instructions clearly intimated
that the jury could not be excused until an amount was agreed
upon,9 the court apparently felt that the jury was subjected to
directions which operated improperly to coerce them to reach an
agreement.
The court in Crim cites as authority for its decision two sec-
tions of the second edition of American Jurisprudence.10 As is
typical of legal encyclopedias, these passages are general in na-
ture, providing little guidance to the bench's formulation of
proper jury instructions. However, Crim clearly constitutes a sig-
nificant change in South Carolina law. Prior case law is replete
with instructions, approved by the supreme court as within the
discretion of the trial judge, which appear to constitute more
egregious attempts to coerce the jury than did the instructions
in Crim.11 In its order, the lower court in Crim cited several
South Carolina cases which in its opinion were controlling au-
thority, and concluded that the instructions were well within the
5. Id.
6. Id. at 640-41, 300 S.E.2d at 731.
7. Id. at 642, 300 S.E.2d at 732.
8. Id. at 643, 300 S.E.2d at 733.
9. Id., 300 S.E.2d at 732.
10. 76 A. JUR. 2D Trial §§ 1054-55 (1975).
11. See, e.g., Nelson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 191 S.C. 345, 4 S.E.2d 273 (1939);
Coleman v. Stevens, 124 S.C. 8, 117 S.E. 305 (1923); Terry v. Richardson, 123 S.C. 319,
116 S.E. 273 (1923); Harper v. Abercrombie, 115 S.C. 360, 105 S.E. 749 (1921); Caldwell
v. Duncan, 87 S.C. 331, 69 S.E. 660 (1910); State v. Jones, 86 S.C. 17, 67 S.E. 160 (1910);
Nickles v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 74 S.C. 102, 54 S.E. 255 (1906).
208 [Vol. 36
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boundaries established by those cases. 2 As will be shown, prior
to this case the available case law rejected arguments of jury co-
ercion in appeals involving a wide variety of instructions.
Within six weeks in 1921, the South Carolina Supreme
Court affirmed two sets of supplemental instructions which
would appear to be outside the rule developed in Crim. In the
first of those cases, Terry v. Richardson,3 the trial judge stated
that he regreted having to keep a jury confined in the jury room,
but that it was the only way known to the law to get a verdict.
On appeal, the supreme court stressed that no language in the
instructions could fairly be construed as encouraging a surrender
of the jurors' conscientious convictions merely for the purpose of
agreement.14 The court stated that, "While a. . .judge may not
coerce a jury, he is not precluded from indicating very plainly
that he will not be coerced by the jury.",'
5
In the second case, Coleman v. Stevens," the trial judge
drew an analogy between the jury's failure to reach a verdict and
an army regiment's inability to perform its duty in time of war."7
In addition, the judge admonished the jury that if the truth was
so elusive that twelve men could not ascertain it after deliberat-
ing, then perhaps they had all lapsed back into the ages from
which they came.18 The supreme court, affirming the supplemen-
tal instructions, stressed the importance of reviewing instruc-
tions in their entirety, noted the absence of an express command
that the jury agree, and concluded by refusing to endorse the
general proposition that moral persuasion to discharge an im-
12. In his order, the trial judge specifically mentioned the following cases as illustra-
tive of the law: Nelson, 191 S.C. 345, 4 S.E.2d 273 (1939); Terry, 123 S.C. 319, 116 S.E.
273 (1923); Fairey v. Hanes, 107 S.C. 115, 91 S.E. 976 (1917); State v. Shuman, 106 S.C.
150, 90 S.E. 596 (1916). Record at 156. Nelson and Terry are discussed in the text. The
trial judge in Fairey threatened to jail the jury if they could not agree and a divided
court held that that threat was coercive. 107 S.C. at 117, 91 S.E. at 976. The trial judge
in Shuman told the jury to deliberate for three weeks if necessary and stated that no
jury would declare a mistrial on him unless they wanted to go to jail. 106 S.C. at 152, 90
S.E. at 597.
13. 123 S.C. 319, 116 S.E. 273 (1923).
14. Id., 116 S.E. at 275.
15. 123 S.C. at 327, 116 S.E. at 276 (quoting State v. Drakeford, 120 S.C. 400, 113
S.E. 307 (1922)).
16. 124 S.C. 8, 117 S.E. 305 (1923).
17. Id. at 16-17, 117 S.E. at 308.
18. Id. at 17, 117 S.E. at 308.
1985]
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portant duty may be so strong as to constitute error of law.' 9
A more recent case, South Carolina Public Service Author-
ity v. Spearwant Liquidating Co.,20 noted that it was the trial
judge's duty to admonish the jury of the desirability and impor-
tance of trying to reconcile their differences and to agree upon a
verdict.21 Because the trial judge is exposed to the entire atmo-
sphere of the trial and is cognizant of all the facts and circum-
stances developed during the trial, the supreme court declined
to interfere with the judge's exercise of discretion unless clear
abuse was shown. 2
The decision in Crim is an attempt by the supreme court to
update its position on instructions urging agreement. Those in-
structions which may be fairly understood as a threat that the
jury will not be excused until it reaches a verdict are prejudicial
and constitute reversible error. The court made no mention of a
need to review the instructions in their entirety; therefore, com-
ments by the judge which tend to reinforce the jury's indepen-
dence, such as "I'm not asking any of you to abandon a feeling
or belief,123 may not suffice to cure the prejudicial effect of the
instructions. Nor did the court recognize a difference between
deliberations on guilt or liability and deliberations involving
only the amount of damages,24 impliedly rejecting instructions
which stress the desirability and importance of agreement by
minimizing the importance of a particular verdict. Consequently,
if the judge's charge expressly commands the jury to reach a ver-
dict upon pain of indefinite detention, the charge is improperly
coercive.
The supreme court has attempted to divorce itself from the
not-so-subtle moral persuasion allowed by the court in years
past. Although after Crim it still remains within the discretion
of the trial judge to urge a jury to agree on a verdict,25 the line
19. Id.
20. 196 S.C. 481, 13 S.E.2d 605 (1941)(quoting Dover v. Lockhart Mills, 86 S.C. 229,
68 S.E. 525 (1910)).
21. 196 S.C. at 490, 13 S.E.2d at 608.
22. Id.
23. 278 S.C. at 641, 300 S.E.2d at 732.
24. The trial judge stated that, "We're not dealing here with guilt or innocence of an
individual. What you have to decide is one question, and that's simply an amount of
money." Id. See also Nickles v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 74 S.C. 102, 54 S.E. 255 (1906).
25. 278 S.C. at 642, 300 S.E.2d at 732.
[Vol. 36
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between persuasion and coercion is a fine one. Crim was admit-
tedly a close call by the court, and the opinion leaves judges
with nothing more than passages from a legal encyclopedia to
use as a guide by which to frame instructions urging a verdict.
While the simple solution may seem to be the less said the bet-
ter, problems of docket control and allocation of judicial re-
sources demand that trials end in a verdict whenever possible. It
is hoped that future opinions will delineate the precise limits of
the trial judge's discretion so that the bench may advise and ad-
monish the jury to reach a verdict without committing reversible
error.
George K. Lyall
II. FmUCIARY SHIELD DOCTRINE: NOT A LIMITATION ON SOUTH
CAROLINA LONG-ARM STATUTE
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals examined the so-called
"fiduciary shield" doctrine in Columbia Briargate Co. v. First
National Bank In Dallas.2 The court held that the "fiduciary
shield" doctrine, which has been held in some jurisdictions to
preclude the exercise of individual personal jurisdiction over an
agent of a nonresident corporation, poses no limitation on South
Carolina's long-arm statute.
The litigation arose out of the sale of an apartment complex
in Columbia, South Carolina. The plaintiff-purchaser was a Cali-
fornia limited partnership. The defendants included the First
National Bank In Dallas and its vice president, Vaughn Pearson.
The plaintiff alleged that, during negotiations for the sale of the
apartments by the bank to the plaintiff, the defendant vice pres-
ident made false and fraudulent representations about the con-
dition of the apartments to the plaintiff. The defendants were
served with process under the South Carolina long-arm statute,
and the defendant bank was dismissed for improper venue.28
26. 713 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir. 1983). The case was on appeal from the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803 (1976).
28. Any action or proceeding against a national banking association for which
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had been appointed receiver, or
against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of such associa-
tion, shall be brought in the district or territorial court of the United States
held within the district in which that association's principal place of business is
1985]
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Thus, the remaining issue, whether Pearson was subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction in the South Carolina District Court, de-
pended on the court's interpretation of the fiduciary shield
doctrine.
Pearson argued that he was immune from service of process
under the South Carolina long-arm statute because of the opera-
tion of the fiduciary shield doctrine, even though it was con-
ceded that he was personally substantively liable for the tort."
The fiduciary shield doctrine has been recognized by some juris-
dictions (primarily New York and the Second Circuit) as a limi-
tation on state long-arm statutes, precluding the exercise of in-
dividual personal jurisdiction over an agent of a nonresident
corporate defendant whose conduct in his corporate capacity in
the forum state becomes the subject of a lawsuit.30 In holding
Pearson subject to personal jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit
found that the fiduciary shield doctrine is not a constitutional
principle, but rather a narrow equitable principle of construction
of state long-arm statutes, applicable only in jurisdictions where
the statute does not extend to the utmost limits of due process.31
Therefore, the fiduciary shield doctrine is not applicable in
South Carolina where the long-arm statute, unlike the New York
long-arm statute, extends jurisdiction over a nonresident "to the
outer perimeter allowed by due process.
''s2
The court offered a general rule which would allow its deci-
sion in the instant case and the Second Circuit decisions to be
located, or, in the event any State, county, or municipal court has jurisdiction
over such an action or proceeding, in such court in the county or city in which
that association's principal place of business is located.
12 U.S.C. § 94 (Supp. IV 1982).
29. Under the controlling South Carolina law, "[a]n agent's liability for his own tor-
tious acts [in such an action is plain and] is unaffected by the fact that he acted in his
representative capacity." 713 F.2d at 1054 (quoting Lawlor v. Scheper, 232 S.C. 94, 93-
99, 101 S.E.2d 269, 271 (1957)). The application of the fiduciary shield doctrine would
yield inconsistent results: a resident agent would be liable for torts committed in a cor-
porate capacity but a nonresident agent who had committed the same tort while in the
state, but who had since left, would be immune from service. 713 F.2d at 1059.
30. See, e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1347
(E.D.N.Y. 1981).
31. "New York had not 'sought to obtain [under its long-arm statute] full in per-
sonam jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries who transact business within its boundaries.'"
713 F.2d at 1056 (quoting United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 242 (2d
Cir. 1966)).
32. O'Neal v. Hicks Brokerage Co., 537 F.2d 1266, 1268 (4th Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 36212
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read together. The court noted that the Second Circuit decisions
which are typically "cited as illustrative of the application of the
doctrine as a constitutional principle. . . rested expressly upon
the fact that the agent had not actually and individually partici-
pated in a tort in the forum state. '3 3 Other courts have recog-
nized that even in states where the fiduciary shield doctrine is
applicable, a nonresident agent who actually commits a tort
while in the forum state is amenable to jurisdiction in that
state. 4 Thus, as a general proposition, a nonresident corporate
agent who actually commits a tort in his corporate capacity
within the forum state is individually amenable to service of
process, "provided the long-arm statute of the forum state is
co-extensive with the full reach of due process."35 Conversely, if
the agent's only connection with the tort was outside the forum
state, he is not amenable to service of process as an individual
under the state long-arm statute.3
The opinion concluded with a discussion of the equitable
nature of the fiduciary shield doctrine. In dicta, the court noted
that the result would have been the same even if the fiduciary
shield doctrine were applicable in South Carolina. In those
states which have recognized the fiduciary shield doctrine, the
rule is not a mechanical device, but rather an equitable principle
to be applied or not applied as the equities between the parties
may require. Because the bank was immune from suit in South
Carolina and its agent was the only tortfeasor amenable to the
forum court's jurisdiction, the equities in Columbia Briargate
Co. favored the plaintiff.
37
33. 713 F.2d at 1061. This rationale was first developed in Idaho Potato Comm'n v.
Washington Potato Comm'n, 410 F. Supp. 171, 182 (D. Idaho 1976).
34. See Kinstler v. Saturday Evening Post Co., 507 F. Supp. 113, 115 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Agra Chem. Distrib. Co. v. Marion Laboratories, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 699, 703
(W.D.N.Y. 1981).
35. 713 F.2d at 1064 (emphasis by court).
36. Id. This formulation equates amenability to long-arm jurisdiction with substan-
tive liability in tort of the agent, and avoids the inconsistencies mentioned supra note
29. Under the rules formulated by the Fourth Circuit, a corporate agent is immune from
suit on an alleged tort under both general corporate law and the state long-arm statute
unless the agent actually committed the tort within the forum state. Thus, if liable sub-
stantively, the agent will also be subject to jurisdiction under the forum state's long-arm
statute, provided that statute reaches to the full extent of due process. See Escude Cruz
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1980); Cf. Hyatt Int'l Corp. v.
Inversiones Los Jabillos, C.A., 558 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Il. 1982).
37. If the corporate defendant is not responsive, it is possible that the fiduciary
1985]
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For the South Carolina practitioner, the fiduciary shield
doctrine appears to be a dead letter, except, of course, when a
client is served in his corporate capacity under another state's
long-arm statute and that statute is not as broad as due process
itself. Because of conflict among the circuits, the United States
Supreme Court will probably decide the issue eventually. For
the present, the Fourth Circuit decision stands, and it is unlikely
that the South Carolina Supreme Court will decide any differ-
ently should the question be presented to it. Therefore, it ap-
pears that the fiduciary shield doctrine will not immunize defen-
dants against service under the long-arm statute of South
Carolina.
Fred L. Kingsmore, Jr.
III. DAMAGE CLAIM ALLOWED IN A CLASS ACTION
In Miller v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corporation,38 the
South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the joinder provisions
of the South Carolina Code. 9 The court held that two causes of
action, one brought individually and one brought as a class ac-
tion, could be joined under section 15-15-10. The decision may
be more important for its implications than for its express
holding.
Miller arose when the appellant financed .a mobile home
through the respondent finance company. Appellant's original
complaint alleged that respondent assessed delinquency charges
in violation of the South Carolina Code"0 and charged an
amount in excess of that allowed by statute.41 The complaint
shield doctrine may be disregarded. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899
(2d Cir. 1981). Cf. Bulova Watch, 508 F. Supp. at 1347-50, where the court, in balancing
the equities of the parties, found that, because the corporate defendant was amenable to
jurisdiction, the equities favored the agent.
38. 279 S.C. 90, 302 S.E.2d 340 (1983).
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-15-10 (1976) provides in pertinent part- "The plaintiff may
unite in the same complaint several causes of action... when they all arise out of: (1)
The same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of action ....
But the causes of action so united must ... affect all the parties to the action ......
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-203 (Supp. 1983) governs delinquency charges on con-
sumer credit sales.
41. 279 S.C. at 92, 302 S.E.2d at 340. Appellant was late in paying an installment
and respondent assessed a delinquency charge. Appellant made payments on time there-
after but never made up the missed payment. Respondent's policy was to apply each
214 [Vol. 36
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stated two causes of action. The first, which was brought indi-
vidually, sought the return of alleged excess charges, plus a stat-
utory penalty for each alleged violation. The second cause of ac-
tion was brought by appellant as a class action on behalf of
herself and all persons similarly situated, as permitted under the
South Carolina Code,42 and sought only the return of the alleged
illegal charges. Common to both counts was a prayer that the
respondent be enjoined from further violations of the statute
governing consumer credit transactions.
Two issues appear to have been raised on appeal: (1)
whether the two counts contained in the complaint were prop-
erly joined, and (2) whether the second count could proceed as a
class action. The court conceived the case differently, however,
noting that the only real issue was whether the two causes of
action were properly joined in one complaint.43 The court con-
cluded that the two causes of action could be joined under sec-
tion 15-15-10 of the Code." However, the real significance of
this case may lie in the court's underlying assumptions. The
court observed: "We are of the opinion that either cause of ac-
tion standing alone would be proper. '45 The court also stated:
"If any reason exists as to why the case should not proceed as a
class action, it does not appear on the face of the complaint."
46
These statements indicate that the court's only concern was
with joinder, and that the court had no objection to the second
cause of action proceeding as a class action.
This approach is in stark contrast to previous decisions con-
cerning class actions. Three general theories have been used to
payment received to the previous month's default so that appellant was assessed a late
charge every month, although only one payment was late. Appellant alleges that because
South Carolina law allows only the default charge imposed on the original missed pay-
ment, respondent violated S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-203 (Supp. 1983), entitling appellant to
recover the wrongful charges and the penalty of "not less than $100 nor more than
$1000" imposed by S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-202(3) (Supp. 1983). This penalty is expressly
made unavailable in class actions.
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-50 (1976) provides: "When the question is one of a com-
mon or general interest to many persons or when the parties are very numerous and it
may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend
for the benefit of the whole."
43. 279 S.C. at 93, 302 S.E.2d at 341.
44. The court allowed the joinder under S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-15-10(1)(text set out
supra note 39).
45. 279 S.C. at 93, 302 S.E.2d at 341.
46. Id.
19851
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satisfy the joinder requirement in class action suits. For a class
action to be allowed, class members have traditionally been re-
quired to show at least one of the following elements: (1) some
prior legal or organizational bond among class members; (2) an
interest in a common fund; or (3) an interest in a common form
of relief.47 Class action suits have traditionally been denied when
actual damages, in addition to equitable relief, are sought on be-
half of the class.4" In Miller, however, the court allowed the class
action to proceed even though both damages and equitable relief
were sought. In making this decision, the court reasoned that
the instant case was primarily an equitable action to halt defen-
dant's illegal actions and that the damage claims were ancillary
to the main action.49 Future cases will reveal the extent of the
court's willingness to ignore claims for monetary relief and to
characterize the action as primarily equitable in nature. A po-
tential class plaintiff's chances of success will be greatly in-
creased if he can characterize the monetary relief as restitution-
ary or rescissionary.2
In deciding this case, the court, through the use of its equi-
table powers, has taken the first step toward allowing a damage
award in a class action. However, this may be a limited step,
considering that the monetary relief sought in Miller was resti-
tutionary in nature and could be easily determined by an exami-
nation of the books of the finance company. The court may not
allow a class action where the determination of class damages
would be more complicated or subjective,51 or where such dam-
ages would be more in the nature of pure damages with no resti-
tution involved. Obviously the court would be less inclined to
47. For an extensive discussion of class actions in South Carolina, see Note, State
Class Actions, 27 S.C.L. REv. 87 (1975).
48. See Long v. Seabrook, 260 S.C. 562, 197 S.E.2d 659 (1973); Benjamin v. South
Carolina Nat'l Bank of Charleston, 269 S.C. 250, 237 S.E.2d 72 (1977).
49. 279 S.C. at 92, 302 S.E.2d at 341. Exactly this characterization was foreseen in
Note, supra note 47, at 112.
50. "[O]nce equity jurisdiction obtains, the court administers complete relief even if
that includes establishing purely legal rights which are otherwise beyond the scope of its
authority." Note, supra note 47, at 112 n.85 (construing Parker Peanut Co. v. Felder, 207
S.C. 63, 34 S.E.2d 488 (1945)).
51. In the past, the court's aim "has been the avoidance of administratively burden-
some ... types of class litigation in which separate determinations of some sort must be
made in regard to each class member." Brief of Respondent at 11-12, Miller. The con-
flicting policy concerns are the "avoidance of a multiplicity of suits [and] inconsistent
judgments as well as judicial economy and efficiency." Note, supra note 47, at 112 n.85.
[Vol. 36
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allow a class action in which damages are the primary relief
sought because the action would not be "primarily equitable in
nature,' 52 and would therefore fall outside the Miller rationale.
3
Fred L. Kingsmore, Jr.
IV. INTEREST ON JUDGMENTS: NEW RATES APPLY TO
UNSATISFIED PORTION OF JUDGMENT AS OF AMENDMENT'S
EFFECTIVE DATE
In Southeastern Freight Lines v. Michelin Tire Corp.,4 the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that an amendment to a
statute increasing the legal rate of interest on judgments applies
to judgments entered before the effective date of the amend-
ment, to the extent that such judgments remain unsatisfied as of
the effective date of the change.55 This issue was certified to the
court by the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina 6 pursuant to Rule 46 5 of the rules of practice of
the South Carolina Supreme Court. The court's holding puts
South Carolina in accord with the majority of jurisdictions.
52. See supra note 49.
53. "In federal practice, certification of the class occurs at a different time and sub-
sequent to rulings on the adequacy of the complaint, and that practice has been im-
pliedly adopted by this Court." Reply Brief of Appellant at 5-6, Miller (construing
Knowles v. Standard Say. and Loan Ass'n, 271 S.C. 217, 246 S.E.2d 879 (1978) and
O'Quinn v. Beach Assoc., 272 S.C. 95, 249 S.E.2d 734 (1978)). However, the court's al-
lowing the complaint to state a cause of action for class damages is still a major depar-
ture from past decisions.
54. 279 S.C. 174, 303 S.E.2d 860 (1983).
55. Id. at 175, 303 S.E.2d at 861.
56. Id.
57. Section 1 of Rule 46 of the Rules of the South Carolina Supreme Court provides:
The Supreme Court in its discretion may answer questions of law certified to it
by any federal court of the United States or the highest appellate court or an
intermediate appellate court of any other state, when requested by the certify-
ing court if there are involved in any proceeding before that court questions of
law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the
certifying court as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no con-
trolling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 46, § 1.
58. See, e.g., Morley v. Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 162
(1892); Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co. v. Central Rigging & Contracting Corp., 684
F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1982); Glades County v. Kurtz, 101 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1939); Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore v. Kelso Corp., 294 Md. 267, 449 A.2d 406 (1982); Mc-
Bride v. Superior Court of County of Maricopa, 130 Ariz. 193, 635 P.2d 178 (1981); Senn
v. Commerce-Manchester Bank, 603 S.W.2d 551 (Mo. 1980); Ferris v. First Nat'l Bank &
11
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On March 31, 1981, the plaintiffs were awarded judgments
against the defendants in amounts totalling $1,370,500.9 At the
time the judgments were entered, the applicable federal stat-
ute60 provided for postjudgment interest to be calculated in ac-
cordance with state law." In 1981, South Carolina's statutory
rate of interest on judgments was 8 %.11 However, subsequent
to entry of the judgments, but before satisfaction, the statutory
interest rate on judgments was increased to 14%.11' This
amended rate became effective on June 9, 1982."
On October 27, 1982, after exhausting all of their appeals,
the defendants tendered payment to the plaintiffs, purportedly
to satisfy the outstanding judgments.6 8 Payment was made of
the principal and postjudgment interest at the rate of 8 % for
the entire period from March 31, 1981 to October 27, 1982. The
plaintiffs brought an action in federal court, arguing that they
were entitled to interest at the rate of 8 % from March 31,
1981, to June 9, 1982, and at the rate of 14% from June 9, 1982,
to October 27, 1982. Conversely, the defendants contended that
the previous statutory interest rate of 8 / % was exclusively ap-
plicable to the judgments because they were entered before the
effective date of the amended statute and, therefore, that they
had fully satisfied the judgments.6 6
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 46, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court agreed to resolve the controversy surrounding the
application of the increased interest rate.6 7 Because the court's
resolution of the novel question affected all judgments that were
Trust Co., 96 Wis.2d 476, 292 N.W.2d 357 (Ct. App. 1980); Ridge v. Ridge, 572 S.W.2d
859 (Ky. 1978); Ferry v. Ferry, 201 Neb. 595, 271 N.W.2d 450 (1978); Noe v. City of
Chicago, 56 Ill.2d 346, 307 N.E.2d 376 (1974); Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Pay-
ette Lumber Co., 54 Idaho 765, 37 P.2d 407 (1934). See generally 45 Am. Jur. 2D Interest
and Usury § 11 (1969); Annot., 4 A.L.R. 2d 932, 949-52 (1949).
59. 279 S.C. at 175, 303 S.E.2d at 861.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976) provides in part: "Such interest shall be calculated from
the date of the entry of the judgment, at the rate allowed by State law."
62. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-20 (Supp. 1981)(amended 1982).
63. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-20(B)(Supp. 1983) provides: "All money decrees and
judgments of courts enrolled or entered shall draw interest according to law. The legal
interest shall be at the rate of fourteen percent per annum."
64. Id.
65. 279 S.C. at 175, 303 S.E.2d at 861.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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unsatisfied on June 9, 1982, both the South Carolina Trial Law-
yer's Association and the South Carolina Defense Trial Attor-
ney's Association petitioned and were granted leave to file ami-
cus curiae briefs.
In its opinion, the court recognized the defendants' conten-
tion that statutory enactments are presumed to be prospective
in their application absent clear legislative intent or specific pro-
visions to the contrary."' The court also agreed that only a reme-
dial or procedural statute is generally held to be applicable ret-
roactively. 9 The court ruled, however, that the legislative intent,
as evinced by the clear language of the statute, was to apply the
new interest rate to all judgments remaining outstanding on the
effective date of the amendment.7 0 In addition, the court charac-
terized this application as prospective rather than retroactive
because it applied only to the remaining unpaid portions of
judgments rather than to the entire amount originally entered. 1
Thus, this opinion rests not only on the intent of the legislature
but also on the court's characterization of the application as
prospective.
The court's finding that the language of the statute clearly
evidences the legislature's intent is peculiarly in the eyes of the
beholder. However, the court's second determination, that the
application of the amended rate is, in any event, prospective, is
clearly within the mainstream of legal thought.72 The courts
which have addressed the issue have overwhelmingly held that
the obligation to pay postjudgment interest is created by stat-
ute, not by contract, and that changes in the interest rate are
simply statutory changes within legislative purview. 73 In con-
trast, a retroactive law is one which takes away or impairs vested
rights. 4 Citing with approval the opinion of the Maryland Su-
preme Court in Mayor and the City of Baltimore v. Kelso
Corp., the court held that the right of a judgment creditor to
interest on a judgment, which did not exist at common law, is
68. Id.
69. Id. at 175-76, 303 S.E.2d at 861.
70. Id. at 176, 303 S.E.2d at 861.
71. Id.
72. See supra note 58.
73. Id.
74. Easterby-Thackston, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 477 F. Supp. 954, 956 (D.S.C. 1979).
75. 294 Md. 267, 449 A.2d 406 (1982).
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intended to compensate the judgment creditor fairly for the
damages sustained by nonpayment of the judgment. Because the
legislature alone created this right, the opinion continues, the
legislature in its wisdom should determine the interest rate nec-
essary to provide fair compensation to judgment creditors.76
The semantic characterization of the statute's application as
prospective or retroactive is not only a legally satisfying ap-
proach to resolving the issue, but it yields a result consistent
with the purpose of the statute as well. The purpose of postjudg-
ment interest is to compensate for the loss of monies due and
owing to the creditor,77 and any change by the legislature must
be viewed as a recognition that the old rate no longer fairly com-
pensates judgment creditors. Applying a new statutory rate only
to those judgments entered after its effective date fails to accom-
plish the legislative purpose since to do so creates an entire class
of judgments which do not receive the benefit of the legislature's
decision that an increase is required for fair compensation. A
judgment debtor could receive a windfall by delaying satisfac-
tion of a judgment while earning a higher rate of return else-
where. Thus, judgment creditors could face delays of uncertain
duration or be forced to seek judicial remedies to enforce their
judgments while judgment debtors take advantage of the dispar-
ity between the old and current rate. The effect of the Michelin
Tire decision, however, is to require all judgment debtors to pay
the same statutory interest rate, thereby reducing the incentive
to delay the satisfaction of judgments.
Assuming continued increasing interest rates and assuming
only minor delays between a statute's creation and its effective
date, periodic amendments of section 34-31-2078 and the court's
current interpretation of its application should combine to pro-
tect the judgment creditor's financial interests while imposing
upon the judgment debtor a reasonably accurate penalty for
nonpayment. In periods of radical economic change or when the
legislature is slow or reluctant to change the legal interest rate,
however, this method of adjustment will not keep up with mar-
ket interest rates nor will it avoid potential windfalls to either
party. Thus, the rationale of Michelin Tire also suggests a
76. 279 S.C. at 176, 303 S.E.2d at 862.
77. Id.
78. See supra note 74.
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needed change in South Carolina law.
The concern in Michelin Tire was for the judgment creditor
who sought to impose interest rates more reflective of the cost of
money in an inflationary time. At another point in time, a judg-
ment debtor who is paying interest at the statutorily designated
rate could be paying a rate in excess of current commercial rates
for the use of money. Legislative machinery is clumsy and can-
not react quickly enough to guarantee that both the creditor and
debtor will be treated fairly by the statutory interest rate. In
addition, frequently changing economic conditions mandate per-
petual monitoring and changes by legislative committees,
lawmakers and the bar. Were the South Carolina legislature to
adopt a variable legal rate of interest, indexed to a reliable eco-
nomic indicator, 9 the purpose of the legislature would be fur-
thered, while a constant economic concern of the legislators
would be removed. Such a statutory scheme would also be con-
sistent with the policy underlying the decision in Michelin Tire.
Neither the debtor nor the creditor should be penalized, nor
should either receive a windfall at the expense of the other. Le-
gitimate appeals should be encouraged and unfair delays dis-
couraged without the need for constant action by the lawmakers.
A variable rate of postjudgment interest would serve this pur-
pose by providing a flexible standard, more consistent with the
present conditions of the economy.
George K. Lyall
79. For example, the federal statute amending 28 U.S.C. § 1961, effective October 1,
1982 provides in part:
(a) Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered
in a district court. Execution therefor may be levied by the marshall in any
case where, by the law of the state which such court is held, execution may be
levied for interest on judgments recovered in the courts of the state. Such in-
terest shall be calculated from the date of entry of the judgment, at a rate
equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent (as determined by the Secretary of
the Treasury) of the average accepted auction price for the last auction of fifty-
two week United States Treasury bills settled immediately prior to the date of
judgment. The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts shall distribute notice of that rate and any changes in it to all Federal
judges.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1961 (Supp. 1983).
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V. PROCEDURAL RULES
A. Summons (Complaint Not Served): High Standard of
Compliance with Procedural Requirements
In Don Shevey & Spires, Inc. v. American Motors Realty
Corp.,80 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the plain-
tiff has the burden of prosecuting his action, and that the trial
court may properly dismiss an action for unreasonable neglect in
proceeding with a cause.8 1 This case reaffirms the court's disap-
proval of the procedural device of the Summons (Complaint Not
Served) and its insistence upon strict compliance with proce-
dural requirements which attach to this type of Summons.
These requirements will be enforced even if the result is a dis-
missal which denies the plaintiff his day in court.
The plaintiffs in Shevey sought recovery based upon the al-
leged wrongdoing of the defendants in connection with an auto-
mobile dealership which existed from April 1972 until Septem-
ber 1974.82 The plaintiffs initiated this action under sections 56-
15-10 through 56-15-350 of the South Carolina Code83 (South
Carolina Dealer's Day in Court Act) and, as the genesis of their
action, relied upon the service of a Summons (Complaint Not
Served) on July 15, 1976.84 It was undisputed that neither the
original Summons nor any other document of the action was
filed with the court until October 1977,85 more than fifteen
months after service. No Complaint was served upon the defen-
dants until March 20, 1978.86 The defendants then removed the
case to federal court 87 and answered the Complaint."" After sev-
80. 279 S.C. 58, 301 S.E.2d 757 (1983).
81. Id. at 60, 301 S.E.2d at 758.
82. Record at 59.
83. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-15-10 to -350 (1976) provide generally for the regulation of
manufacturers, distributors, and dealers of motor vehicles.
84. 279 S.C. at 59, 301 S.E.2d at 758.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 60, 301 S.E.2d at 758.
87. Id. at 62, 301 S.E.2d at 759 (Harwell, J., dissenting).
88. One element of the answer was an allegation that the Complaint failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted because the acts complained of occurred more
than four (4) years prior to the service of the Complaint, in violation of the four (4) year
statute of limitations provided for the plaintiffs' statutory cause of action in S.C. CODE
ANN. § 56-15-120 (1976). The federal court did not rule on this affirmative defense, but
the defense did serve as notice to the plaintiffs that the defendants considered the Sum-
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eral months of discovery, the case was remanded to state court
on February 25, 1980, based upon a finding that complete diver-
sity of citizenship did not exist between the parties.89
Based upon the plaintiffs' failure to file the Summons
within ten days of service as required by section 15-19-1000 of
the South Carolina Code,90 defendants moved to dismiss the ac-
tion in March 1980, pursuant to the authority granted to the
trial judge by section 15-35-20 of the Code.91 Because this mo-
tion was made almost four years after the defective service and
nearly two years after the statute of limitations had expired on
the plaintiffs' cause of action, a dismissal, whether with or with-
out prejudice, would preclude the plaintiffs' day in court. The
trial court granted the motion for dismissal, stating that to allow
the plaintiffs to remain in court on a foundation which included
(1) the use of a Summons (Complaint Not Served), (2) the fail-
ure to file the Summons for over fifteen months, and (3) the fail-
ure to serve and file a Complaint for over twenty months, would
be to completely disregard the plaintiffs' burden of proceeding
with due diligence.92 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed by a
vote of three to two.
9 3
In affirming the trial judge's decision, the supreme court
based its ruling on two elements of the same duty. First, the
court held that the plaintiff at all times has the burden of prose-
cuting the action.94 The defendant may have a right to press for
trial but has no duty to do so. Aside from responding to actions
taken by the plaintiff, the defendant may remain passive during
mons (Complaint Not Served) a defective commencement of the action. Record at 62.
89. 279 S.C. at 62, 301 S.E.2d at 760.
90. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-1000 (1976) provides:
The summons and the several pleadings in an action shall be filed with the
clerk within ten days after the service thereof respectively, or the adverse
party, on proof of the omission, shall be entitled without notice to an order
from a judge that such summons or pleading be filed within a time to be speci-
fied in the order or be deemed abandoned.
S.C. CODE Am. § 15-9-1000 (1976).
91. S.C. CODE Am. §15-35-20 (1976) provides: "The court may dismiss the com-
plaint, with costs in favor of one or more defendants, in case of unreasonable neglect on
the part of the plaintiff to serve the summons on other defendants or to proceed in the
cause against the defendant or defendants served."
92. 279 S.C. at 61, 301 S.E.2d at 759.
93. Id. Justice Gregory joined the dissent of Justice Harwell.
94. Id. at 60, 301 S.E.2d at 758.
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the litigation. 5 Coextensive with the plaintiff's burden is the
trial court's authority to dismiss an action because of a plain-
tiff's unreasonable neglect in proceeding.96 This power, the court
stated, is necessary to enable trial judges to control and manage
their ever-expanding dockets.9
Secondly, the court held that in addition to the general duty
to prosecute any cause of action, plaintiffs who choose to initiate
their cases with the Summons (Complaint Not Served) have al-
ways been held to especially high standards of compliance with
procedural requirements." This point has been made in a series
of South Carolina cases,9 9 and particularly in a recent decision 00
in which the court termed the Summons (Complaint Not
Served) "barely tolerable and belong[ing] on the lawyer's shelf
with rare exception."' 011 The court in Shevey concluded that al-
though these cases hold plaintiffs who choose to use the Sum-
mons (Complaint Not Served) to the highest standard of compli-
ance with pleading and practice requirements, the plaintiffs in
Shevey failed to meet even the minimum standards of com-
mencing and prosecuting an action.102
As reported by the majority opinion, the facts of this case
appear to compel this result. The dissenting opinion, however,
graphically illustrates that although mitigating factors, such as
the disbarment of the plaintiffs' original attorney, a lack of sub-
stantial prejudice to the defendants, an expired cause of action
and apparent waiver of the procedural defects by the defen-
dants, existed, those factors were not sufficient to overcome the
plaintiffs' failure to prosecute the action. Nor did those factors
overcome the court's disdain for the Summons (Complaint Not
Served). Of the factors which the dissent considered persuasive,
the most troubling is the defendants' seeming lack of diligence
in capitalizing on the filing deficiency. Other than an indirect
95. Id., 301 S.E.2d at 759 (quoting from Thomas & Howard Co. v. Fowler, 238 S.C.
46, 119 S.E.2d 97 (1961)).
96. See supra note 91.
97. 279 S.C. at 60, 301 S.E.2d at 758.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Richardson Constr. Co. v. Meek Eng'g and Constr., Inc., 274 S.C. 307,
262 S.E.2d 913 (1980); Williams v. Carpenter, 273 S.C. 339, 256 S.E.2d 316 (1979).
100. 274 S.C. at 310, 262 S.E.2d at 915.
101. Id., 262 S.E.2d at 913.
102. 279 S.C. at 61, 301 S.E.2d at 759.
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reference in the answer of March 1978, the defendants did not
raise the procedural defects until their motion to dismiss in
March 1980.103 Instead, the defendants removed the case to fed-
eral court and participated in several pre-trial motions and ex-
tensive discovery, waiting almost four years after the service of
the Summons to move to dismiss. The dissent recognized that
South Carolina case law clearly mandated dismissal without
prejudice by the trial judge but felt that the combination of
waiver by the defendants and loss of the cause of action by the
plaintiffs should intervene to allow proceedings to continue
under the original Summons.0 Labelling the majority's holding
as purely technical, the dissent charged that the court's ruling
sacrificed substance to form.105
The dissent's argument is based on facts unique to this case
and does not illustrate a tolerance for the Summons (Complaint
Not Served). Rather, it illustrates the lengths to which the su-
preme court will reach to quash substandard procedural compli-
ance when a party chooses to employ this "barely tolerable"
method of commencing an action. By ignoring the defendants'
inattention to the defective service and the plaintiffs' loss of
their cause of action, and instead taking the opportunity to
again remind litigants of their burden to proceed in an action
through rigid compliance with the court's rules, this opinion sig-
nals in the strongest of terms the disfavored status of the Sum-
mons (Complaint Not Served).
Another, more subtle reason may also serve as a foundation
for the decision in Shevey. The service of a summons com-
mences civil actions in South Carolina under section 15-9-10 of
the South Carolina Code.106 Its purpose is to place the defendant
on notice that the litigation has begun.107 In Richardson Con-
struction Co. v. Meek Engineering & Construction Co.,108 the
appellant, in contesting a default judgment award on a Sum-
mons (Complaint Not Served), argued a question of due pro-
103. See supra note 88.
104. 279 S.C. at 63, 301 S.E.2d at 760 (Harwell, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
106. S.C. CODE ANN. §15-9-10 (1976) provides: "Civil actions in the courts of record
of this State shall be commenced by service of a summons."
107. H. LIGHTSEY, SOUTH CAROLINA CODE PLFADING 30 (1976).
108. 274 S.C. 307, 262 S.E.2d 913 (1980).
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cess.109 Because the issue was not raised in the trial court, the
supreme court declined to consider whether the use of the Sum-
mons (Complaint Not Served) reached constitutional dimensions
as violative of due process. Although Meek involved a default
judgment,110 taken together, Meek and Shevey may suggest that
the court is waiting for an opportunity to strike down the use of
a Summons (Complaint Not Served) on a constitutional basis
because the device does not properly place the defendant on no-
tice that the litigation has begun.
It therefore appears that practitioners who continue to em-
ploy the Summons (Complaint Not Served) do so at their cli-
ent's risk. Given the plethora of case law expressly questioning
its use, an attorney who, for whatever reason, fails to comply
strictly with every procedural rule will not be rescued by the
court, and thus may be a strong candidate for a malpractice ac-
tion. The prudent attorney should therefore consider the Sum-
mons and Complaint as inseparable.
George K. Lyall
B. Compliance with Appellate Rules of Procedure Is Critical
In Germain v. Nichol,"' the South Carolina Supreme Court
dismissed the appellant's appeal because of his failure to comply
with section 6 of Supreme Court Rule 4 and because he failed to
provide a sufficient record of trial testimony.1 2 This decision
emphasizes the importance of carefully preparing each exception
on appeal and endeavoring to comply with all the technical re-
quirements of appellate procedure to avoid summary dismissal.
The evidence at trial established the conversion of respon-
dent's property by the appellant. The evidence of resulting dam-
age to the property was uncontroverted because the appellant
was not present at trial and presented no witnesses. The trial
court directed a verdict as to liability, leaving only the issue of
damages to be determined.113 The jury was unable to make a
determination as to damages and the court, after denying appel-
109. Id. at 311 n.1, 262 S.E.2d at 916 n.1.
110. Id.
111. 278 S.C. 508, 299 S.E.2d 335 (1983).
112. Record at 1.
113. Id.
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lant's motion for mistrial based upon a deadlocked jury, directed
a verdict of $1,200 in actual damages.114 Counsel for the defen-
dant excepted to the court's action. 1 5
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court dismissed
the first three of appellant's four exceptions as violative of sec-
tion 6 of Supreme Court Rule 4, in that they did not contain a
complete assignment of error 11 Although the court was not spe-
cific in explaining how appellant's exceptions violated the rule,
prior decisions have defined the applicable requirements.
In Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. McElmurray,117 the court stated
that the purpose of an exception is to present some distinct
principle or question of law which the appellant claims the trial
court has violated, and to present it in a form that will allow it
to be properly reviewed."" Fruehauf requires an appellant to
strive for clarity and specificity in presenting the issues on ap-
peal so that the court may easily recognize the questions it is
asked to decide.119 An exception which is general, vague, or in-
definite will not suffice, 120 and "[i]n the absence of any proper
exception there is nothing properly before the court for re-
view.""" However, this rule has been ignored in cases where the
appellant "has attempted to present a meritorious assignment of
114. This was the figure respondent's expert placed on the damage. Id. at 1-2.
115. Id. at 2. Appellant's four exceptions were:
(1) That the Presiding Judge abused his discretion in ordering the jury to re-
turn a verdict of special damages.
(2) That the Trial Judge abused his discretion in failing to apply the applica-
ble law in reference to special verdicts.
(3) The Presiding Judge abused his judicial discretion in userpping [sic] right-
ful duty of the jury, i.e. determination of special damages.
(4) That the Presiding Judge further abused his judicial discretion in directing
a verdict in the amount of $1,200.00 actual damages against the Defendant
when the evidence presented and viewed most favorably as to the Defendant
would not justify an award of actual damages in the amount of $1,200.00.
Id. at 24.
116. Sup. CT. R. 4, § 6 states in pertinent part- "Each exception must contain a
concise statement of one proposition of law or fact which this Court is asked to review
..." and "[e]ach exception must contain within itself a complete assignment of
error. ..."
117. 236 S.C. 141, 113 S.E.2d 756 (1969).
118. Id. at 144, 113 S.E.2d at 758.
119. See also Brady v. Brady, 222 S.C. 242, 72 S.E.2d 193 (1952).
120. 236 S.C. at 144, 113 S.E.2d at 758.
121. Odom v. County of Florence, 258 S.C. 480, 481, 189 S.E.2d 293, 294 (1972).
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error. ' 122 The court, in ignoring certain technical violations, has
shown a willingness to look past the form to the substance of the
assignment of error, and to allow the appeal to go forward if the
exception presents a meritorious assignment of error. The result
is a liberalization of the technical rules in the cases in which the
court chooses to waive the breach of the rule and consider the
exception. However, the court's enunciated guidelines leave
room for wide discretion and for value judgments as to the mer-
its of a case on appeal.
The first three exceptions in Germain apparently fail to
state specifically the controlling principle of law. In his fourth
exception, the appellant claimed that the evidence presented at
trial was insufficient to support an award of actual damages.123
In dismissing this portion of the case, the court reasoned that
the appellant had the burden of providing the court with a rec-
ord sufficient to enable it to decide the issues presented by the
appeal. The court then concluded that the appellant had not
satisfied this burden because he failed to provide the court "with
any of the trial testimony. 1 24 Citing Wilson v. American Casu-
alty Co.,1 25 the court effectively held that where an exception
requires the consideration of evidence adduced at trial, and this
evidence is not included in the transcript of record, the excep-
tion will not be considered.
126
The holding in Germain represents a continued willingness
on the part of the South Carolina Supreme Court to strictly en-
force the rules of appellate procedure and to summarily dismiss
appeals which do not comply with these rules. To avoid sum-
mary dismissal, practitioners should make certain that every ex-
ception contains a complete and specific assignment of error and
that a complete record of the proceeding below is provided to
the court. While the supreme court has broad discretion in ap-
plying these technical rules of appellate procedure, it would be
unwise to depend on the court's recognition of the merits of an
122. Aaron v. Hampton Motors, Inc., 240 S.C. 26, 37, 124 S.E.2d 585, 590 (1962); see
also 222 S.C. at 246, 72 S.E.2d at 194-95.
123. 278 S.C. at 509, 299 S.E.2d at 335.
124. Id.
125. 252 S.C. 393, 166 S.E.2d 797 (1969).
126. Id. at 397, 166 S.E.2d at 798.
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appeal. Only complete technical compliance will protect the
practitioner.
127
Fred L. Kingsmore, Jr.
127. In addition, the court noted that, "[I]n the Statement of the case appellant
concedes that respondent's evidence was uncontroverted.".The court then held that,
"The parties are bound by the Statement of the case." 278 S.C. at 509,299 S.E.2d at 336.
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